

Fortinet, Inc.

FortiGate 7.2 and 7.4



FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

FortiGate Next-Generation Firewalls with FortiOS 7.2 and 7.4

FortiGateRugged-60F, FortiGate 200F, 201F, 600F, 601F, 1000F, 1001F, 1800F, 1801F, 2600F, 2601F, 3000F, 3001F, 3500F, 3501F, 3700F, 3701F, 4400F, and 4401F

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FortiGate 7.2/ 7.4 FIPS 140-3 Level 2 Hardware Security Policy

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1 General

1.1 Overview

This document is a FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for Fortinet's FortiGate Next-Generation Firewalls with FortiOS versions 7.2 and 7.4. This policy describes how the FortiGate Modules (hereafter referred to as the 'modules') meet the FIPS 140-3 security requirements and how to operate the modules in a FIPS compliant manner. This policy was created as part of the FIPS 140-3 Level 2 validation of the modules.

The Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3 - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules (FIPS 140-3) details the United States Federal Government requirements for cryptographic modules. Detailed information about the FIPS 140-3 standard and validation program is available on the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) website at <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program>

1.2 Security Levels

Section	Title	Security Level
1	General	2
2	Cryptographic module specification	2
3	Cryptographic module interfaces	2
4	Roles, services, and authentication	3
5	Software/Firmware security	2
6	Operational environment	N/A
7	Physical security	2
8	Non-invasive security	N/A
9	Sensitive security parameter management	2
10	Self-tests	2
11	Life-cycle assurance	2
12	Mitigation of other attacks	2
	Overall Level	2

Table 1: Security Levels

1.3 Additional Information

This policy deals specifically with operation and implementation of the modules in the technical terms of the FIPS 140-3 standard and the associated validation program. Other Fortinet product manuals, guides and technical notes can be found at the Fortinet technical documentation website at <https://docs.fortinet.com>.

Additional information on the entire Fortinet product line can be obtained from the following sources:

Find general product information in the product section of the Fortinet corporate website at <https://www.fortinet.com/products>.

Find on-line product support for registered products in the technical support section of the Fortinet corporate website at <https://support.fortinet.com/>.

Find contact information for technical or sales related questions in the contacts section of the Fortinet corporate website at <https://www.fortinet.com/contact>.

Find security information and bulletins in the FortiGuard Center of the Fortinet corporate website at <https://www.fortiguard.com>.

2 Cryptographic Module Specification

2.1 Description

Purpose and Use:

The FortiGate family of Next Generation Firewalls spans the full range of network environments, from SOHO (Small Office/Home Office) to service provider, offering cost effective systems for any size of application. FortiGate appliances detect and eliminate the most damaging, content-based threats from email and Web traffic such as viruses, worms, intrusions, inappropriate Web content and more in real time — without degrading network performance. In addition to providing application-level firewall protection, FortiGate appliances deliver a full range of network-level services — VPN, intrusion prevention, web filtering, antivirus, antispam and traffic shaping — in dedicated, easily managed platforms.

All FortiGate appliances employ Fortinet's unique FortiASIC content processing chip and the powerful, secure, FortiOS firmware to achieve breakthrough price/performance. The unique, ASIC-based architecture analyzes content and behavior in real time, enabling key applications to be deployed right at the network edge where they are most effective at protecting enterprise networks. They can be easily configured to provide antivirus protection, antispam protection and content filtering in conjunction with existing firewall, VPN, and related devices, or as complete network protection systems. The modules support High Availability (HA) in both Active-Active (AA) and Active-Passive (AP) configurations.

FortiGate appliances support the IPsec industry standard for VPN, allowing VPNs to be configured between a FortiGate appliance and any client or gateway/firewall that supports IPsec VPN. FortiGate appliances also provide SSL VPN services using TLS 1.2 and 1.3.

Module Type: Hardware

Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone

Cryptographic Boundary:

The extent of the cryptographic boundary for the module is the outer metal chassis.

Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):

The modules consist of a firmware-based operating system that runs exclusively on Fortinet's FortiGate product family. FortiGate units are PC-based, purpose-built appliances. The FortiGate appliances are multiple chip, standalone cryptographic modules consisting of production grade components contained in a physically protected enclosure.




Figure 1: Block Diagram

2.2 Module Identification

Tested Module Identification:

Model and/or Part Number	Hardware Version	Firmware Version	Processors	Features
FortiGate 1000F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	Intel Xeon E-2386G	2U, IPS: 19 Gbps
FortiGate 1001F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	Intel Xeon E-2386G	2U, IPS: 19 Gbps
FortiGate 1800F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	Intel Xeon W-3223	2U, IPS: 22 Gbps
FortiGate 1801F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	Intel Xeon W-3223	2U, IPS: 22 Gbps
FortiGate 200F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	Intel Xeon D-1627	1U, IPS: 5 Gbps
FortiGate 201F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	Intel Xeon D-1627	1U, IPS: 5 Gbps
FortiGate 2600F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	Intel Xeon Gold 6208U	2U, IPS: 31 Gbps
FortiGate 2601F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	Intel Xeon Gold 6208U	2U, IPS: 31 Gbps
FortiGate 3000F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	AMD EPYC 7502P	2U, IPS: 36 Gbps
FortiGate 3001F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	AMD EPYC 7502P	2U, IPS: 36 Gbps
FortiGate 3500F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	AMD EPYC 7542	2U, IPS: 72 Gbps
FortiGate 3501F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	AMD EPYC 7542	2U, IPS: 72 Gbps
FortiGate 3700F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	Intel Xeon Gold 6348	2U, IPS: 86 Gbps
FortiGate 3701F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	Intel Xeon Gold 6348	2U, IPS: 86 Gbps
FortiGate 4400F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	Intel Xeon Gold 6248	4U, IPS: 94 Gbps
FortiGate 4401F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	Intel Xeon Gold 6248	4U, IPS: 94 Gbps
FortiGate 600F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	Intel Xeon E-2386G	1U, IPS: 14 Gbps
FortiGate 601F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	Intel Xeon E-2386G	1U, IPS: 14 Gbps
FortiGateRugged-60F	F	FIPS-CC-72-4 (7.2) / FIPS-CC-74-2 (7.4)	Fortinet SoC4	Rugged enclosure, IPS: 950 Mbps

Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware

The tested modules are shown below



Figure 2: FGR-60F



Figure 8: FG-3000F / FG-3001F



Figure 3: FG-200F / FG-201F



Figure 9: FG-3500F / FG-3501F



Figure 4: FG-600F / FG-601F



Figure 10: FG-3700F / FG-3701F



Figure 5: FG-1000F / FG-1001F



Figure 11: FG-4400F / FG-4401F



Figure 6: FG-1800F / FG-1801F



Figure 7: FG-2600F / FG-2601F

2.3 Excluded Components

Each module covered by this security policy comes provisioned with a bootloader tailored to the specific hardware platform. The bootloader does not implement any cryptography, is not used to meet any of the FIPS requirements and is not included in firmware updates.

The bootloader is excluded from the cryptographic module.

2.4 Modes of Operation

Modes List and Description:

Mode Name	Description	Type	Status Indicator
Approved	Consists of FIPS 140-3 compliant cryptography.	Approved	Implicitly indicated by the successful completion of an approved service

Table 3: Modes List and Description

Mode Change Instructions and Status:

The module only supports approved mode of operation. **The module can be used in either of its two network operation modes: NAT/Route or Transparent. Note that "mode of operation" in this context does not refer or have any impact on the approved mode of operation.** NAT/Route mode applies security features between two or more different networks (for example, between a private network and the Internet) where the module functions like a network router. Transparent mode applies security features at any point in a network where the module functions like a network bridge. The current operation mode is displayed on the web-based manager status page and in the output of the get system status CLI command.

2.5 Algorithms

2.5.1 Approved Algorithms:

CP9

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A2240	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-GCM	A2240	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 256	SP 800-38D
HMAC-SHA-1	A2240	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
SHA-1	A2240	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4

Table 4: Approved Algorithms - CP9

CP9Lite

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A2241	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-GCM	A2241	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 256	SP 800-38D
HMAC-SHA-1	A2241	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
SHA-1	A2241	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4

Table 5: Approved Algorithms - CP9Lite

CP9XLite

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A2242	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-GCM	A2242	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External	SP 800-38D

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
		IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 256	
HMAC-SHA-1	A2242	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
SHA-1	A2242	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4

Table 6: Approved Algorithms - CP9XLite

NP7

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A6630	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-GCM	A6630	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 256	SP 800-38D
HMAC-SHA-1	A6630	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A6630	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A6630	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A6630	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
SHA-1	A6630	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A6630	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A6630	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A6630	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4

Table 7: Approved Algorithms - NP7

NP7Lite

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A6631	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-GCM	A6631	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External	SP 800-38D

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
		IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 256	
HMAC-SHA-1	A6631	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A6631	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A6631	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A6631	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
SHA-1	A6631	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A6631	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A6631	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A6631	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4

Table 8: Approved Algorithms - NP7Lite

FortiOS 7.2

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A6641	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC	A6643	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
Counter DRBG	A6641	Prediction Resistance - No Mode - AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - Yes	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A6643	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - extra bits, testing candidates	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A6643	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Component - No	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A6643	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1	A6643	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224	A6643	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A6643	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
HMAC-SHA2-384	A6643	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A6643	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A6643	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384, P-521 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - initiator, responder	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A6643	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192 Scheme - dhEphem - KAS Role - initiator, responder	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KDF IKEv1 (CVL)	A6643	Authentication Method - Digital Signature, Pre-shared Key, Public Key Encryption Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length: 224-8192 Increment 8 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Preshared Key Length - Preshared Key Length: 8-8192 Increment 8	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
KDF IKEv2 (CVL)	A6643	Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length: 224-8192 Increment 8 Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying Material Length: 160-16384 Increment 8 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
KDF SSH (CVL)	A6643	Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A6643	Key Generation Mode - probable Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Primality Tests - 2powSecStr Private Key Format - standard	FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A6643	Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss	FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A6643	Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss	FIPS 186-5
Safe Primes Key Generation	A6643	Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
SHA-1	A6643	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224	A6643	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A6643	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A6643	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
SHA2-512	A6643	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL)	A6643	Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
TLS v1.3 KDF (CVL)	A6643	HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384 KDF Running Modes - DHE, PSK, PSK-DHE	SP 800-135 Rev. 1

Table 9: Approved Algorithms - FortiOS 7.2

FortiOS 7.4

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A6642	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CBC	A6644	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
Counter DRBG	A6642	Prediction Resistance - No Mode - AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - Yes	SP 800-90A Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A6644	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - extra bits, testing candidates	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A6644	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Component - No	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A6644	Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1	A6644	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224	A6644	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A6644	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A6644	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A6644	Key Length - Key Length: 8-1024 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A6644	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384, P-521 Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - initiator, responder	SP 800-56A Rev. 3

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3	A6644	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192 Scheme - dhEphem - KAS Role - initiator, responder	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KDF IKEv1 (CVL)	A6644	Authentication Method - Digital Signature, Pre-shared Key, Public Key Encryption Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length: 224-8192 Increment 8 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Preshared Key Length - Preshared Key Length: 8-8192 Increment 8	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
KDF IKEv2 (CVL)	A6644	Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length - Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret Length: 224-8192 Increment 8 Derived Keying Material Length - Derived Keying Material Length: 160-16384 Increment 8 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
KDF SSH (CVL)	A6644	Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A6644	Key Generation Mode - probable Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Primality Tests - 2powSecStr Private Key Format - standard	FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A6644	Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss	FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A6644	Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss	FIPS 186-5
Safe Primes Key Generation	A6644	Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
SHA-1	A6644	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224	A6644	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A6644	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A6644	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A6644	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65528 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627 (CVL)	A6644	Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	SP 800-135 Rev. 1
TLS v1.3 KDF (CVL)	A6644	HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384 KDF Running Modes - DHE, PSK, PSK-DHE	SP 800-135 Rev. 1

Table 10: Approved Algorithms - FortiOS 7.4

FortiOS CPU Jitter Entropy library

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
SHA3-256	A4977	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 202

Table 11: Approved Algorithms - FortiOS CPU Jitter Entropy library

2.5.2 Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:

Name	Properties	Implementation	Reference
CKG	Key Type:Asymmetric	N/A	SP 800-133r2 Section 4

Table 12: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms

2.6 Security Function Implementations

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
Configuration backup	BC-Auth MAC	Encryption/decryption and authentication of the configuration backup file		AES-CBC: (A6643, A6644) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A6643, A6644) SHA2-256: (A6643, A6644)
Configuration integrity	MAC	Calculates MAC of a configuration file		HMAC-SHA2-256: (A6643, A6644) SHA2-256: (A6643, A6644)
ECDSA CSR	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen DigSig-SigGen	Generate a certificate signing request using ECDSA		ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6643, A6644) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A6643, A6644) SHA2-256: (A6643, A6644)
Entropy	ENT-Cond ENT-ESV	Generate entropy		SHA3-256: (A4977)
FW authentication	DigSig-SigVer	Verifies the signature on firmware		RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A6643, A6644) SHA2-256: (A6643, A6644)
KAS-IPsec	DigSig-SigVer KAS-Full	Establishes an IPsec connection with a remote device	IG D.F:Scenario 2 Path (2) Key confirmation:No Caveat:Provides between 112 and 256 bits of security strength	ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6643, A6644) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A6643, A6644) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A6643, A6644)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			Key derivation:IG 2.4.B SP 800-135rev1 CVL	Safe Primes Key Generation: (A6643, A6644) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A6643, A6644) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A6643, A6644) KDF IKEv1: (A6643, A6644) KDF IKEv2: (A6643, A6644) HMAC-SHA2-224: (A6643, A6644) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A6643, A6644) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A6643, A6644) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A6643, A6644) SHA2-224: (A6643, A6644) SHA2-256: (A6643, A6644) SHA2-384: (A6643, A6644) SHA2-512: (A6643, A6644)
KAS-SSH	DigSig-SigVer KAS-Full	Establishes an SSH connection with a remote device	IG D.G:Scenario 2 Path (2) Key confirmation:No Caveat:Provides between 112 and 256 bits of security strength Key derivation:IG 2.4.B SP 800-135rev1 CVL	ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6643, A6644) Safe Primes Key Generation: (A6643, A6644) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A6643, A6644) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A6643, A6644) KDF SSH: (A6643, A6644) SHA-1: (A2240, A6643, A6644) SHA2-256: (A6643, A6644)
KAS-TLS12	DigSig-SigVer KAS-Full	Establishes a TLS 1.2 connection with a remote device	IG D.G:Scenario 2 Path (2) Key confirmation:No Caveat:Provides between 112 and 256 bits of security strength Key derivation:IG 2.4.B SP 800-135rev1 CVL	ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6643, A6644) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A6643, A6644) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A6643, A6644) Safe Primes Key Generation: (A6643, A6644) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
				56Ar3: (A6643, A6644) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A6643, A6644) TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627: (A6643, A6644) HMAC-SHA-1: (A2240, A6643, A6644) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A6643, A6644) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A6643, A6644) SHA-1: (A2240, A6643, A6644) SHA2-256: (A6643, A6644) SHA2-384: (A6643, A6644)
KAS-TLS13	DigSig-SigVer KAS-Full	Establishes a TLS 1.3 connection with a remote device	IG D.G:Scenario 2 Path (2) Key confirmation:No Caveat:Provides between 112 and 256 bits of security strength Key derivation:IG 2.4.B SP 800-135rev1 CVL	ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6643, A6644) ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A6643, A6644) RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A6643, A6644) Safe Primes Key Generation: (A6643, A6644) KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A6643, A6644) KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3: (A6643, A6644) TLS v1.3 KDF: (A6643, A6644) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A6643, A6644) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A6643, A6644) SHA2-256: (A6643, A6644) SHA2-384: (A6643, A6644)
Key decrypt	BC-UnAuthDecrypt	Decrypting of static keys used for authentication in network protocols		AES-CBC: (A6643, A6644)
Key encrypt	BC-UnAuthEncrypt	Encryption of the pre-shared key used for reestablishing IPSec tunnels.		AES-CBC: (A6643, A6644)

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
Operator authentication	SHA	Generates a hash of the operator password		SHA2-256: (A6643, A6644)
RSA CSR	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen DigSig-SigGen	Generate a certificate signing request using RSA		RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A6643, A6644) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A6643, A6644) SHA2-256: (A6643, A6644)
Random number	DRBG	Generate random number using the DRBG		Counter DRBG: (A6641, A6642) AES-CBC: (A6641, A6642)
Transfer data with CBC	BC-AuthDecrypt BC-AuthEncrypt	Encrypt and decrypt network packets over the IPSec, SSH or TLS protocols when a non-AEAD cipher suite is negotiated.		AES-CBC: (A2240, A6630, A2241, A2242, A6631) HMAC-SHA-1: (A2240, A6630, A2241, A2242, A6631) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A6630, A6631) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A6630, A6631) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A6630, A6631) SHA-1: (A2240, A6630, A2241, A2242, A6631) SHA2-256: (A6630, A6631) SHA2-384: (A6630, A6631) SHA2-512: (A6630, A6631)
Transfer data with GCM	BC-AuthDecrypt BC-AuthEncrypt	Encrypt and decrypt network packets over the IPSec, SSH or TLS protocols when an AEAD cipher suite is negotiated.		AES-GCM: (A2240, A6630, A2241, A2242, A6631)
CKG	CKG	Generation of seeds for asymmetric key generation		CKG: ()

Table 13: Security Function Implementations

2.7 Algorithm Specific Information

2.7.1 AES-GCM

FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Scenario 1

TLS 1.2: The module supports TLS 1.2 GCM Cipher Suites listed in SP800-52 Rev2, Section 3.3.1 and defined in RFCs 5246, 5288, 5289, 8422.

During FIPS testing, the module's implementation of TLS 1.2 was successfully tested against an independently developed instance of TLS 1.2. This demonstrated that the module's implementation is compliant with the following aspects of RFC 5246:

- the counter portion of the IV is set by the Module within its cryptographic boundary.
- when the nonce_explicit portion of the IV reaches the maximum possible value ($2^{32}-1$), a rekeying is triggered

The IV is only used in the context of TLS 1.2.

TLS 1.3: The module supports TLS 1.3 GCM Cipher Suites listed in SP800-52 Rev2, Section 3.3.1 and defined in RFC 8446. During FIPS testing, the module's implementation of TLS 1.3 was successfully tested against an independently developed instance of TLS 1.3. This demonstrated that the module's implementation is compliant with the following aspects of RFC 8446:

- the client_write_iv and server_write_iv values are derived entirely within the module from the application_traffic_secret,
- when the sequence_number reaches the maximum possible value ($2^{64}-1$), a rekeying is triggered

The IV is only used in the context of TLS 1.3.

The module does not persistently store SSPs specific to a TLS session. In the event that the module's power is lost and then restored, new keys and IVs for use with AES-GCM within TLS are established.

IPsec-v3: If IKEv2 is used, the Module is compliant with RFC 4106 and/or RFC 5282 (depending on the protocols supporting GCM). The module uses an RFC 7296 compliant KDF to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES-GCM encryption keys are derived.

When:

- the module exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given security association, or
- the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values (e.g., a 64-bit counter starting from 0 and increasing, when it reaches the maximum value of $2^{64}-1$)

the module will trigger a rekeying with IKEv2 to establish a new encryption key for the security association.

In case the module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES-GCM encryption/decryption is established.

SSHv2: This module is compliant with RFCs 4252, 4253 and the rules for using AES-GCM documented in RFC 5647. The IV is only used in the context of the AES-GCM mode encryptions within the SSHv2 protocol.

No more than $2^{64}-1$ AES encryptions may be performed in the same session. The session is automatically terminated once this number of encryptions is reached. If the invocation counter reaches its maximum value $2^{64}-1$, the next AES-GCM encryption is performed with the invocation counter set to 0.

When a session is terminated for any reason, the keys and IVs are zeroised and cannot be used again.

In case the module's power is lost and then restored, new keys and IVs for use with the AES-GCM are established

2.8 RBG and Entropy

Cert Number	Vendor Name
E139	Fortinet

Table 14: Entropy Certificates

Name	Type	Operational Environment	Sample Size	Entropy per Sample	Conditioning Component
FortiOS CPU Jitter Entropy library 1.0	Non-Physical	AMD EPYC 7502P, AMD EPYC 7542, Fortinet SoC4, Intel Xeon D-1627, Intel Xeon E-2386G, Intel Xeon W-3223, Intel Xeon Gold 6208U, Intel Xeon Gold 6348, Intel Xeon Gold 6248	256	256	SHA3-256 (A4977)

Table 15: Entropy Sources

The module uses FortiOS CPU Jitter Entropy Library 1.0 to seed the DRBG during the modules' boot process and to periodically reseed the DRBG. The entropy loaded into the approved AES-256 bit DRBG is 256 bits. The entropy source is over-sampled and then an SHA3-256 post-conditioning component is applied. The reseed interval (number of requests between reseeds) of CTR_DRBG in FortiGate Linux kernel is 100000 (within the maximum reseed interval of 2^{48} specified for this CTR_DRBG as per SP800-90Arev1).

The module uses CTR_DRBG as per section 10.2.1 of SP 800-90Arev1 to generate random numbers.

2.9 Key Generation

The module implements asymmetric key generation services compliant with FIPS 186-5 to generate RSA and ECDSA keys. Seeds for these services are generated from the unmodified output of the module's approved DRBG.

2.10 Key Establishment

The module implements the following approved key agreement methods (per 140-3 IG D.F):

Elliptic curves

The module establishes EC DH shared secrets compliant to SP 800-56Arev3, using elliptic-curves specified in Appendix D of SP 800-186.

Finite fields

The module establishes DH shared secrets compliant to SP 800-56Arev3, using safe prime groups listed in Appendix D of SP 800-56Arev3.

2.11 Industry Protocols

The module implements compliant key derivation functions (KDFs) as part of its implementation of the following protocols:

- TLS 1.2
- TLS 1.3
- IKEv1
- IKEv2
- SSH

No parts of these protocols, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.

2.12 Additional Information

When the module is powered on, it initiates self-tests against the algorithms claimed in section 2.5. Once all the tests are passed, the module continues to function in the approved mode. Please refer to section 11.1 start up procedure for installation process.

3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces

3.1 Ports and Interfaces

Physical Port	Logical Interface(s)	Data That Passes
Network ports	Data Input	Network traffic, passwords, user data, new firmware images, configuration data, configuration file
Network ports	Data Output	Network traffic, configuration file
Network ports	Control Input	Commands
Network ports	Status Output	Module status and configuration information
USB Port	Data Input	New firmware images, configuration file
USB Port	Data Output	Configuration file, logs
Serial Interface	Control Input	Commands
Serial Interface	Status Output	Module status and configuration information
Reset button	Control Input	Reset/zeroise command
LEDs	Status Output	Module status
Power port(s)	Power	None

Table 16: Ports and Interfaces

FortiGate's logical interfaces and physical interfaces are described above.

The module does not implement a control output interface.

4 Roles, Services, and Authentication

4.1 Authentication Methods

Method Name	Description	Security Mechanism	Strength Each Attempt	Strength per Minute
IPSec	Establishing a secure connection over IPSec	KAS-IPsec	1 in 5.2×10^{33}	1 in 6.6×10^{24}
Password	Username and password	Operator authentication	1 in 2.8×10^{15}	1 in 111262

Table 17: Authentication Methods

The module implements identity-based authentication. To access management services the module enforces SFA (Single factor authentication) mechanism (i.e. username and password). The minimum password length is 8 characters (maximum password length is 128 characters) chosen from the set of ninety-four (94) characters. New passwords are required to include 1 uppercase character, 1 lowercase character, 1 numeric character, and 1 special character.

When connecting to the module over IPSec, the module authenticates the other device using a public key certificate. The other device must minimally provide a 2048-bit RSA public key, providing 112-bits of security strength.

For both authentication methods, the strength-per-minute is computed based on the maximum throughput of the module's 25 Gigabit network ports.

4.2 Roles

Name	Type	Operator Type	Authentication Methods
Admin	Identity	CO	Password
User	Identity	User	IPSec

Table 18: Roles

The module provides the following roles:

Crypto Officer (CO)

The 'Admin' operator is initially assigned to the Crypto-officer role. A Crypto Officer has read-write-execute access to all the module's administrative services. The initial Crypto Officer can create accounts for additional operators. These additional operators are also assigned the Crypto Officer role and can be assigned a range of read-write-execute or read only access permissions including the ability to create accounts.

Network User

The module also supports a Network User (or just 'User') role. All operators that establish a connection to the module are assigned the Network User role. Network Users can make use of the network traffic services, but cannot access the module for administrative purposes.

The module does not provide a Maintenance role.

4.3 Approved Services

The following table details the approved services available to each role, the types of access for each role and the Keys or CSPs they affect.

The access types are abbreviated as follows:

- G – Generate - The module generates or derives the SSP.
- R – Read - The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
- W – Write - The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
- E – Execute - The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
- Z – Zeroise - The module zeroises the SSP

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Add/delete operator	Add or delete operator account	System Logs	User data	Status	None	Admin - Crypto officer password: Z
Authenticate to Module	Crypto Officer authenticates to the module over CLI/GUI	System Logs	Password	Status	Operator authentication	User - Crypto officer password: W
Backup/restore configuration file	Backup/restore configuration file	System Logs	Command	Status	Configuration backup	Admin - Configuration encryption key: E - Configuration backup key: R,W,E - Crypto officer password: None
Connect the module to remote FortiAnalyzer for transferring module's local logs to FortiAnalyzer using TLS	Connect to FortiAnalyzer for log transfer via OFTP over TLS	System Logs	Command	Status	KAS-TLS12 Random number CKG	Admin - DH Private Key: G,E,Z - DH Public Key: G,R,E,Z - ECDH Private Key: G,E,Z - ECDH Public Key: G,R,E,Z - TLS-PMS: G,E,Z - TLS12-MS: G,E,Z - TLS-SAK: G

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- TLS-SEK: G - DRBG Output: E - DH Peer Public Key: W,E,Z - ECDH Peer Public Key : W,E,Z - TLS Client key: W,E,Z - DH-SS: G - ECDH-SS: G - GCM-IV: G
Connect to module remotely for web admin using SSH	The module offers authentication over console port	System Logs	Command	Status	Entropy KAS-SSH Random number CKG	Admin - DH Private Key: G,E,Z - DH Public Key: G,R,E,Z - ECDH Private Key : G,E,Z - ECDH Public Key : G,R,E,Z - SSH-SS: G,E,Z - SSH-IK: G - SSH-EK: G - DRBG Output: E - DH Peer Public Key: W,E,Z - ECDH Peer Public Key : W,E,Z - SSH client public key: W,E,Z - SSH server public key: R - DH-SS: G - ECDH-SS: G - GCM-IV: G
Connect to module remotely for web admin using TLS 1.2	The module offers authentication over TLS 1.2	System Logs	Command	Status	KAS-TLS12 Random number CKG	User - DH Private Key: G,E,Z - DH Public Key: G,R,E,Z

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- ECDH Private Key : G,E,Z - ECDH Public Key : G,R,E,Z - TLS13-HS: G,E,Z - TLS13-HTS: G,E,Z - TLS13-MS: G,E,Z - TLS13-TK: G - DRBG Output: E - DH Peer Public Key: W,E,Z - ECDH Peer Public Key : W,E,Z - TLS Client key: W,E,Z - TLS Server Public Key: R - DH-SS: G - ECDH-SS: G - GCM-IV: G
Connect to module remotely for web admin using TLS 1.3	The module offers authentication over TLS 1.3	System Logs	Command	Status	KAS-TLS13 Random number CKG	User - DH Private Key: G,E,Z - DH Public Key: G,R,E,Z - ECDH Private Key : G,E,Z - ECDH Public Key : G,R,E,Z - TLS-PMS: G,E,Z - TLS12-MS: G,E,Z - TLS-SAK: G - TLS-SEK: G - DRBG Output: E - DH Peer Public Key: W,E,Z - ECDH Peer Public Key : W,E,Z - TLS Client key: W,E,Z

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- TLS Server Public Key: R - DH-SS: G - ECDH-SS: G - GCM-IV: G
Enable approved mode of operation (Console only)	Enable approved mode of operation	System Logs	Command	Status	Configuration integrity	Admin - Configuration integrity key: E
Enable/disable alternating bypass mode	Configure the IPsec VPN policies	System Logs	Command	Status	Configuration integrity	Admin - Configuration integrity key: E
Establish IPsec connection	Establish IPsec connection	System Logs	Command	Status	KAS-IPsec Random number CKG	User - DH Private Key: G,E,Z - DH Public Key: G,R,E,Z - ECDH Private Key : G,E,Z - ECDH Public Key : G,R,E,Z - IKE-PSK: E - SKEYID: G,E,Z - SKEYID_e: G - SKEYID_a: G - DRBG Output: E - DH Peer Public Key: W,E,Z - ECDH Peer Public Key : W,E,Z - IKE RSA Peer Public key: W,E,Z - IKE ECDSA Peer Public Key: W,E,Z - SKEYSEED: G,E,Z - SK_a: G - SK_e: G - IKE RSA Public Key: R - IKE ECDSA

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						Public Key: R - DH-SS: G - ECDH-SS: G - GCM-IV: G
Execute FIPS-CC on-demand self-tests (console only)	Execute self tests manually	System Logs	Command	Status	FW authentication	Admin - Firmware update key: E
Execute factory reset (disable approved mode, Console only)	Zeroise the module	System Reboot	Command	-	None	Admin - Crypto officer password: Z - Configuration integrity key: Z - Configuration encryption key: Z - Configuration backup key: Z - Firmware update key: Z - IPSec Manual Authentication key: Z - IPsec Manual Encryption key: Z - IKE RSA Private Key: Z - IKE RSA Public Key: Z - IKE ECDSA Private Key: Z - IKE ECDSA Public Key: Z - HA Password: Z - HA Encryption key: Z - TLS Server Private Key: Z - TLS Server Public Key: Z - SSH server private key: Z

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- SSH server public key: Z
Execute firmware update	Execute firmware update	System Logs	FW image	Status	FW authentication	Admin - Firmware update key: E
Format log disk (console only)	Format log disk	System Logs	Command	Status	None	Admin
Generate CSR	Generate certificate signing request	System Logs	Command	CSR	ECDSA CSR RSA CSR Random number CKG	Admin - IKE RSA Private Key: G,E - IKE RSA Public Key: G,R,E - IKE ECDSA Private Key: G,E - IKE ECDSA Public Key: G,R,E - DRBG Output: E
Generate entropy	Generate entropy for seeding the DRBG (Cannot be operator invoked)	Implicit	Command	Entropy	Entropy	Unauthenticated - Entropy input: G
Generate random number	Generate random number for other module service (Cannot be operator invoked)	Implicit	Entropy	Random number	Random number	Unauthenticated - Entropy input: E - DRBG Seed: G - DRBG V: E - DRBG Key: E - DRBG Output: G
Modify operator preferences	Modify operator preferences	System Logs	User data	Status	None	Admin
Read log data	Read log data	System Logs	Command	Log data	None	Admin
Read/set/delete/modify HA configuration	Configure the module's high availability ports	System Logs	Configuration data	Status	Configuration integrity	Admin - HA Password: W - HA Encryption key: W - Configuration integrity key: E

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
Read/set/delete/modify IPSec/SSL VPN configuration	Configure the module's VPN	System Logs	Configuration data	Status	Configuration integrity	Admin - IPSec Manual Authentication key: W - IPsec Manual Encryption key: W
Read/set/delete/modify configuration	Configure the module	System Logs	Configuration data	Status	Configuration integrity	Admin
Set/reset operator password	Sets or resets an operator password	System Logs	Command, password	Status	None	Admin - Crypto officer password: W
Show approved mode enabled (console/cli only)	Display the module's mode	System Logs	Command	Status	None	Admin
Show system status	Show system status	Status displayed via CLI/GUI	Command	Status	None	Admin
Show version	Display the version of the module	Status displayed via CLI/GUI	Command	Status	None	Admin
Traffic over HTTP	Traffic over HTTP	Implicit	HTTP request	HTTP data	Transfer data with GCM Transfer data with CBC	User - TLS-SAK: E - TLS-SEK: E - TLS13-TK: E - GCM-IV: E
Traffic over IPsec	Traffic over IPsec	Implicit	Traffic data	Traffic data	Transfer data with GCM Transfer data with CBC	User - SKEYID_a: E - SKEYID_e: E - SK_a: E - SK_e: E - IPSec Manual Authentication key: E - IPsec Manual Encryption key: E - GCM-IV: E
Traffic over SSH	Traffic over SSH	Implicit	SSH Command	Status	Transfer data with GCM	Admin - SSH-IK: E

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
					Transfer data with CBC	- SSH-EK: E - GCM-IV: E
Key encrypt	Encryption of the pre-shared key used for reestablishing IPSec tunnels. (Cannot be operator invoked)	Implicit	-	-	Key encrypt	User - Configuration encryption key: E - IKE-PSK: None
Key decrypt	Decryption of static keys used for authentication in network protocols. Decryption of previously established IPSec pre shared key. (Cannot be operator invoked)	Implicit	-	-	Key decrypt	Admin - Configuration encryption key: E - IPSec Manual Authentication key: None - IKE-PSK: None - IKE RSA Private Key: None - IKE RSA Public Key: None - IKE ECDSA Private Key: None - IKE ECDSA Public Key: None - HA Encryption key: None - HA Password: None - SSH server private key: None - SSH server public key: None

Table 19: Approved Services

4.4 Non-Approved Services

The module does not provide any non-approved services.

4.5 External Firmware Loaded

The module supports the updating of the entire firmware image. Firmware images are transferred into the module by the crypto officer from the administrative GUI over HTTPS. On load, the new firmware image is authenticated using an RSA 2048-bit digital signature verification. A successful verification will trigger an automatic reboot of the module resulting in the zeroisation of all SSPs.

Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate, is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.

4.8 Additional Information

The module supports two methods of handling VPN traffic: policy based (for IPsec and SSL VPN) and interface based (for IPsec VPN only).

Policy Based VPN

Firewall policies with IPsec or SSL-VPN mean that the firewall is functioning as a VPN start/end point for the specified source/destination addresses and will encrypt/decrypt traffic according to the policy. Firewall policies with an action of accept mean that the firewall is accepting/sending plaintext data for the specified source/destination addresses.

Interface Based VPN

Interface based VPN is supported for IPsec only. A virtual interface is created and any traffic routed to the virtual interface is encrypted and sent to the VPN peer. Traffic received from the peer is decrypted. Traffic through the virtual interface is controlled using firewall policies. However, unlike policy based VPN, the action is restricted to Accept or Deny and all traffic controlled by the policy is encrypted/decrypted.

5 Firmware Security

5.1 Integrity Techniques

The module uses RSA 2048-bit digital signature as an approved integrity technique for the verification of firmware. The integrity test runs when the host device starts.

5.2 Initiate on Demand

The integrity test can be invoked on demand from the CLI using:

```
execute fips kat Firmware-integrity
```

6 Operational Environment

This section is not applicable.

6.1 Operational environment type and requirements

Type of Operational Environment: Limited

7 Physical Security

The modules meet FIPS 140-3 Security Level 2 requirements by using production grade components that include standard passivation and an opaque, sealed enclosure.

7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required

Access to the enclosure is restricted through the use of tamper-evident seals to secure the overall enclosure. The tamper-evident seals shall be installed for the module to operate in a compliant manner. All Networking devices need tamper-evident seals to meet the FIPS 140-3 Level 2 Physical Security requirements.

7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals

The tamper seals are not applied at the factory prior to shipping. It is the responsibility of the Crypto Officer to apply the seals before use to ensure full FIPS 140-3 compliance. The seals may be acquired from Fortinet as the tamper evident seal kit “FIPS-SEAL-SILVER”. Once the seals have been applied, the Crypto Officer must develop an inspection schedule to verify that the external enclosure of the modules and the tamper seals have not been damaged or tampered with in any way. Upon viewing any signs of tampering, the Crypto Officer must assume that the device has been fully compromised. The Crypto Officer is required to zeroize the cryptographic module by following the steps in section 9.3 of the Security Policy.

7.2.1 FGR-60F

The FortiGateRugged-60F uses one seal to secure the enclosure.



Figure 12: FGR-60F Seal Placement

7.2.2 FG-200F & 201F

The FortiGate-200F and 201F use one seal to secure the enclosure.



Figure 13: FG-200F & 201F Seal Placement

7.2.3 FG-600F & 601F

The FortiGate-600F and 601F use two seals to secure the enclosure.



Figure 14: FG-600F & 601F Seal Placement

7.2.4 FG-1000F & 1001F

The FortiGate-1000F and 1001F use two seals to secure the enclosure.



Figure 15: FG-1000F & 1001F Seal Placement

7.2.5 FG-1800F & 1801F

The FortiGate-1800F and 1801F use three seals to secure the external enclosure.



Figure 16: FG-1800F & 1801F Seal Placement

7.2.6 FG-2600F & 2601F

The FortiGate-2600F and 2601F use three seals to secure the enclosure.



Figure 17: FG-2600F & 2601F Seal Placement

7.2.7 FG-3000F & 3001F

The FortiGate-3000F and 3001F use one seal to secure the enclosure.



Figure 18: FG-3000F & 3001F Seal Placement

7.2.8 FG-3500F & 3501F

The FortiGate-3500F and 3501F use one seal to secure the enclosure.



Figure 19: FG-3501F & 3501F Seal Placement

7.2.9 FG-3700F & 3701F

The FortiGate-3700F and 3701F use two seals to secure the enclosure.



Figure 20: FG-3700F & 3701F Seal Placement

7.2.10 FG-4400F & 4401F

The FortiGate-4400F and 4401F use four seals to secure the enclosure.




Figure 21: FG-4400F & 4401F Seal 1 Placement




Figure 22: FG-4400F & 4401F Seals 2,3 & 4 Placement

Surface Preparation

The surfaces should be cleaned with 99% Isopropyl alcohol to remove dirt and oil before applying the seals.

Ensure the surface is completely clean and dry before applying the seals. If a seal needs to be re-applied, completely remove the old seal and clean the surface with an adhesive remover before following the instructions for applying a new seal.

Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals

The Crypto Officer is responsible for securing and controlling any unused seals. The Crypto Officer is also responsible for the direct control and observation of any changes to the module such as reconfigurations where the tamper-evident seals are removed or installed to ensure the security of the module is maintained during such changes.

8 Non-Invasive Security

The Module does not implement any mitigation methods against non-invasive attacks.

9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management

9.1 Storage Areas

Storage Area Name	Description	Persistence Type
Flash	Flash memory of host device	Static
RAM	SRDAM of host device	Dynamic

Table 20: Storage Areas

9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods

Name	From	To	Format Type	Distribution Type	Entry Type	SFI or Algorithm
Password	External network device	RAM	Plaintext	Manual	Electronic	
Preloaded	Manufacturer	Flash	Plaintext	N/A	N/A	
Public Key export	RAM	External network device	Plaintext	Automated	Electronic	
Public Key import	External network device	RAM	Plaintext	Automated	Electronic	

Table 21: SSP Input-Output Methods

9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods

Zeroization Method	Description	Rationale	Operator Initiation
Auto	Automatic zeroisation of SSPs that are no longer needed.	Memory is overwritten with 0's	N/A
Reboot	Power-cycle the host device	All RAM is zeroised by a power-cycle.	Unplugging the device
Service	Invoking the service to zeroise all SSPs in persistent storage. Causes an automatic reboot of the host device that zeroises all SSPs in volatile memory.	The CLI command overwrites the storage location keys with 0's, making them irretrievable	Issue the CLI command : execute erase-disk

Table 22: SSP Zeroization Methods

Reconfiguring the module such that FIPS-CC Mode is disable, erases the current configuration and zeroizes most keys and critical security parameters. Persistently stored CSPs are zeroized by erasing the module's boot device by issuing the following CLI command:

```
execute factoryreset
```

Upon completion of the erase operation, the module automatically triggers a power cycle of the host device. This results in the zeroisation of all SSPs stored in volatile RAM. The rebooting of the module indicates that zeroisation has been successful.

9.4 SSPs

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
Configuration backup key	Used to authenticate backups of system configurations	256 - 128	Authentication - CSP			Configuration backup
Configuration encryption key	Used to encrypt sensitive configuration data	256 - 128	Symmetric - CSP			Configuration backup Key decrypt Key encrypt
Configuration integrity key	Used to ensure the integrity and authenticity of configuration data	256 - 128	Authentication - CSP			Configuration integrity
Crypto officer password	Password used by CO to manage cryptographic operations	min 64 - -	Password - CSP			
DH Peer Public Key	Imported peer public key for DH key exchange	2048-8192 - 112-200	Asymmetric - PSP			KAS-IPsec KAS-SSH KAS-TLS12 KAS-TLS13
DH Private Key	Ephemeral private key for DH key exchange	2048-8192 - 112-200	Asymmetric - CSP	KAS-IPsec KAS-SSH KAS-TLS12 KAS-TLS13		KAS-IPsec KAS-SSH KAS-TLS12 KAS-TLS13
DH Public Key	Ephemeral public key for DH key exchange	2048-8192 - 112-200	Asymmetric - PSP	KAS-IPsec KAS-SSH KAS-TLS12 KAS-TLS13		
DH-SS	Shared secret computed from DH keys. Used as TLS 1.2 pre-master secret, TLS 1.3 master secret, SSH shared secret or IKE shared secret	2048-8192 - 112-200	Asymmetric - CSP		KAS-IPsec KAS-SSH KAS-TLS12 KAS-TLS13	KAS-IPsec KAS-SSH KAS-TLS12 KAS-TLS13
DRBG Key	Internal state value for the DRBG	256 - -	DRBG - CSP	Random number		Random number
DRBG Output	Random numbers used in cryptographic algorithms	256 - 256	DRBG - CSP	Random number		Random number
DRBG Seed	Seed used by the DRBG	384 - 256	DRBG - CSP	Random number		Random number

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
DRBG V	Internal state value for the DRBG	128 - -	DRBG - CSP	Random number		Random number
ECDH Peer Public Key	Imported peer public key for ECDH key exchange	P-256/P-384/P-521 - 128/192/256	Asymmetric - PSP			KAS-IPsec KAS-SSH KAS-TLS12 KAS-TLS13
ECDH Private Key	Ephemeral private key for ECDH key exchange	P-256/P-384/P-521 - 128/192/256	Asymmetric - CSP	KAS-IPsec KAS-SSH KAS-TLS12 KAS-TLS13		KAS-IPsec KAS-SSH KAS-TLS12 KAS-TLS13
ECDH Public Key	Ephemeral public key for ECDH key exchange	P-256/P-384/P-521 - 128/192/256	Asymmetric - PSP	KAS-IPsec KAS-SSH KAS-TLS12 KAS-TLS13		
ECDH-SS	Shared secret computed from ECDH keys. Used as TLS 1.2 pre-master secret, TLS 1.3 master secret, SSH shared secret or IKE shared secret	256-521 - 128-256	Asymmetric - CSP		KAS-IPsec KAS-SSH KAS-TLS12 KAS-TLS13	KAS-IPsec KAS-SSH KAS-TLS12 KAS-TLS13
Entropy input	DRBG Input from the entropy pool	256 - 256	DRBG - CSP	Entropy		Random number
Firmware update key	Used to verify the new software load	2048 bits - 112 bits	Asymmetric - PSP			FW authentication
HA Encryption key	Encryption of traffic between units in an HA cluster	128 - 128	Symmetric - CSP			
HA Password	Used to authenticate FortiGate units in an HA cluster	min 64 - -	Password - CSP			
IKE ECDSA Peer Public Key	Peer authentication key	P-256/P-384/P-521 - 128/192/256	Asymmetric - PSP			KAS-IPsec
IKE ECDSA Private Key	Module authentication key	P-256/P-384/P-521 - 128/192/256	Asymmetric - CSP			KAS-IPsec
IKE ECDSA Public Key	Module authentication key	P-256/P-384/P-521 - 128/192/256	Asymmetric - PSP			KAS-IPsec
IKE RSA Peer Public key	Peer authentication key	2048, 3072 - 112, 128	Asymmetric - PSP			KAS-IPsec

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
IKE RSA Private Key	Module authentication key	2048, 3072 - 112, 128	Asymmetric - CSP			KAS-IPsec
IKE RSA Public Key	Module authentication key	2048, 3072 - 112, 128	Asymmetric - PSP			KAS-IPsec
IKE-PSK	IKE Pre-shared key	>112 - >112	Symmetric - CSP	KAS-IPsec		KAS-IPsec
IPsec Manual Authentication key	Used as IPsec Session Authentication Key	160 to 512 - 112 to 256	Symmetric - CSP			Transfer data with CBC
IPsec Manual Encryption key	Used as IPsec Session Encryption Key	160 to 512 - 112 to 256	Symmetric - CSP			Transfer data with GCM Transfer data with CBC
SKEYID	IKEv1 key derivation key	160/224/256/384/512 - 160/224/256	Symmetric - CSP	KAS-IPsec		KAS-IPsec
SKEYID_a	IKEv1 session authentication key	160 to 512 - 112 to 256	Symmetric - CSP	KAS-IPsec		Transfer data with CBC
SKEYID_e	IKEv1 session encryption key	160 to 512 - 112 to 256	Symmetric - CSP	KAS-IPsec		Transfer data with GCM Transfer data with CBC
SKEYSEED	IKEv2 key derivation key	160/224/256/384/512 - 160/224/256	Symmetric - CSP	KAS-IPsec		KAS-IPsec
SK_a	IKEv2 session authentication key	160 to 512 - 112 to 256	Symmetric - CSP	KAS-IPsec		Transfer data with CBC
SK_e	IKEv2 session encryption key	160 to 512 - 112 to 256	Symmetric - CSP	KAS-IPsec		Transfer data with GCM Transfer data with CBC
SSH client public key	Client authentication during SSH session negotiation	2048 - 112	Asymmetric - PSP			KAS-SSH
SSH server private key	Authentication during SSH session negotiation	2048 - 112	Asymmetric - CSP			KAS-SSH
SSH server public key	Authentication during SSH session negotiation	2048 - 112	Asymmetric - PSP			KAS-SSH

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
SSH-EK	SSH Encryption Key	160/256 - 160/256	Symmetric - CSP	KAS-SSH		Transfer data with GCM Transfer data with CBC
SSH-IK	SSH Integrity Key	160/256 - 160/256	Symmetric - PSP	KAS-SSH		Transfer data with CBC
SSH-SS	Shared secret computed during SSH connection	256-8192 - 112-256	Shared Secret - CSP		KAS-SSH	KAS-SSH
TLS Client key	Client authentication key	2048 - 112	Asymmetric - PSP			KAS-TLS12
TLS Server Private Key	Module authentication key	2048 - 112	Asymmetric - CSP			KAS-TLS12
TLS Server Public Key	Module authentication key	2048 - 112	Asymmetric - PSP			KAS-TLS12
GCM-IV	AES-GCM Initialization Vector	128 - -	IV - PSP	KAS-TLS12 KAS-TLS13		Transfer data with GCM
TLS-PMS	TLS 1.2 Pre-master secret	256-8192 - 112-256	Shared secret - CSP		KAS-TLS12	KAS-TLS12
TLS-SAK	TLS 1.2 session authentication key	128/256 - 128/256	Authentication - CSP	KAS-TLS12		Transfer data with CBC
TLS-SEK	TLS 1.2 Session encryption key	128/256 - 128-256	Symmetric - CSP	KAS-TLS12		Transfer data with GCM Transfer data with CBC
TLS12-MS	TLS 1.2 Master Secret	384 - 384	Secret - CSP	KAS-TLS12		KAS-TLS12
TLS13-MS	TLS 1.3 Master Secret	256, 384 - 256, 384	Secret - CSP	KAS-TLS13		KAS-TLS13
TLS13-HS	TLS 1.3 Handshake secret	256, 384 - 256, 384	Secret - CSP	KAS-TLS13		KAS-TLS13
TLS13-HTS	TLS 1.3 Handshake traffic secret	256, 384 - 256, 384	Secret - CSP	KAS-TLS13		KAS-TLS13
TLS13-TK	TLS 1.3 Application traffic key	128, 256 - 128, 256	Symmetric - CSP	KAS-TLS13		Transfer data with GCM

Table 23: SSP Table 1

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
Configuration backup key		Flash:Plaintext		Service	
Configuration encryption key	Preloaded	Flash:Plaintext		Service	
Configuration integrity key	Preloaded	Flash:Plaintext		Service	
Crypto officer password	Password	Flash:Obfuscated		Service	
DH Peer Public Key	Public Key import	RAM:Plaintext		Auto	
DH Private Key		RAM:Plaintext		Auto	DH Public Key:Paired With
DH Public Key	Public Key export	RAM:Plaintext		Auto	DH Private Key:Paired With
DH-SS	Public Key export	RAM:Plaintext		Auto	DH Private Key:Derived from DH Peer Public Key:Derived from
DRBG Key		RAM:Plaintext		Reboot	
DRBG Output		RAM:Plaintext		Reboot	
DRBG Seed		RAM:Plaintext		Auto	
DRBG V		RAM:Plaintext		Reboot	
ECDH Peer Public Key	Public Key import	RAM:Plaintext		Auto	
ECDH Private Key		RAM:Plaintext		Auto	ECDH Public Key :Paired With
ECDH Public Key	Public Key export	RAM:Plaintext		Auto	ECDH Private Key :Paired With
ECDH-SS	Public Key export	RAM:Plaintext		Auto	ECDH Private Key:Derived from ECDH Peer Public Key:Derived from
Entropy input		RAM:Plaintext		Reboot	
Firmware update key	Preloaded	Flash:Plaintext		Service	
HA Encryption key		Flash:Encrypted		Service	
HA Password		Flash:Encrypted		Service	
IKE ECDSA Peer Public Key	Public Key import	RAM:Plaintext		Auto	
IKE ECDSA Private Key	Preloaded	Flash:Encrypted		Service	IKE ECDSA Public Key:Paired With
IKE ECDSA Public Key	Preloaded Public Key export	Flash:Encrypted		Service	IKE ECDSA Private Key:Paired With
IKE RSA Peer Public key	Public Key import	RAM:Plaintext		Auto	
IKE RSA Private Key	Preloaded	Flash:Encrypted		Service	IKE RSA Public Key:Paired With

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
IKE RSA Public Key	Preloaded Public Key export	Flash:Encrypted		Service	IKE RSA Private Key:Paired With
IKE-PSK		Flash:Encrypted		Service	
IPSec Manual Authentication key	Preloaded	Flash:Encrypted		Service	
IPsec Manual Encryption key		RAM:Plaintext		Service Reboot	
SKEYID		RAM:Plaintext		Auto	DH-SS:Derived From ECDH-SS:Derived From
SKEYID_a		RAM:Plaintext		Reboot	SKEYID:Derived From
SKEYID_e		RAM:Plaintext		Reboot	SKEYID:Derived From
SKEYSEED		RAM:Plaintext		Auto	DH-SS:Derived From ECDH-SS:Derived From
SK_a		RAM:Plaintext		Reboot	SKEYSEED:Derived From
SK_e		RAM:Plaintext		Reboot	SKEYSEED:Derived From
SSH client public key	Public Key import	RAM:Plaintext		Auto	
SSH server private key	Preloaded	Flash:Plaintext		Service	
SSH server public key	Preloaded Public Key export	Flash:Plaintext		Service	
SSH-EK		RAM:Plaintext		Reboot	SSH-SS:Derived From
SSH-IK		RAM:Plaintext		Reboot	SSH-SS:Derived From
SSH-SS		RAM:Plaintext		Auto	DH-SS:Alias of ECDH-SS:Alias of
TLS Client key	Public Key import	RAM:Plaintext		Auto	
TLS Server Private Key	Preloaded	Flash:Plaintext		Service	TLS Server Public Key:Paired With
TLS Server Public Key	Preloaded Public Key export	Flash:Plaintext		Service	TLS Server Private Key:Paired With
GCM-IV		RAM:Plaintext		Reboot	TLS12-MS:Derived From TLS13-MS:Derived From
TLS-PMS		RAM:Plaintext		Auto	DH-SS:Alias of ECDH-SS:Alias of

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
TLS-SAK		RAM:Plaintext		Reboot	TLS12-MS:Derived From
TLS-SEK		RAM:Plaintext		Reboot	TLS12-MS:Derived From
TLS12-MS		RAM:Plaintext		Auto	TLS-PMS:Derived From
TLS13-MS		RAM:Plaintext		Auto	TLS13-HTS:Derived From
TLS13-HS		RAM:Plaintext		Auto	DH-SS:Derived From ECDH-SS:Derived From
TLS13-HTS		RAM:Plaintext		Auto	TLS13-HS:Derived From
TLS13-TK		RAM:Plaintext		Reboot	TLS13-MS:Derived From

Table 24: SSP Table 2

In the above table, the "Crypto officer password" is described as being stored in an obfuscated form. For this specific SSP, "obfuscated" means: hashed with the module's implementation of SHA2-256.

9.5 Transitions

The module implements the following security methods that are forecasted to transition over the lifetime of the validation:

Algorithm	Uses
SHA-1	In HMAC-SHA-1 As the hash function in SSH KDF As the MGF (Mask Generation Function) in RSA signature generation
SHA2-224	In HMAC-SHA2-224 In RSA signature generation
HMAC-SHA-1	For MAC Generation As the PRF in IKEv1 KDF As the PRF in IKEv2 KDF
HMAC-SHA2-224	For MAC Generation As the PRF in IKEv1 KDF As the PRF in IKEv2 KDF

SHA-1 becomes disallowed for applying cryptographic protection in January 2031.

10 Self-Tests

When configured as described in section 11.1, the module performs pre-operational and conditional self-tests. These tests include algorithm known answer tests (KATs), pairwise consistency tests (PCTs), a firmware integrity test and a configuration integrity test.

If self-tests pass, module captures a "pass indicator" in this convention 'Running <algorithm name> test... passed. The following is an example of successful self-test:

```
Running AES test .... passed
```

The results of the startup self-tests are displayed on the console during the startup process.

In the event that any of the self-tests fail, the module logs an "error indicator" for the specific test(s). Refer to section 10.4 for details.

10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests

The module performs the following pre-operational self-tests:

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details
Configuration integrity	HMAC-SHA2-256	MAC	Critical Function	Console message	MAC verification
Firmware integrity	RSA 2048-bit, using SHA2-256	SigVer	SW/FW Integrity	Console message	Signature verification

Table 25: Pre-Operational Self-Tests

10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

The module performs the following conditional self-tests. The module contains multiple implementations of some cryptographic algorithms. The module performs self-tests of all implementations.

In the table below,

- (FW) indicates that the self-test exercises the implementation of the algorithm in the firmware image
- (CP9) indicates that the self-test exercises the implementation of the algorithm in the CP9, CP9Lite or CP9XLite component
- (NP7) indicates that the self-test exercises the implementation of the algorithm in the NP7 or NP7Lite component

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-CBC (CP9)	128 & 256-bit	KAT	CAST	Console message	Encrypt, decrypt	On boot
AES-CBC (NP7)	128 bit	KAT	CAST	Console message	Encrypt, decrypt	On boot
AES-ECB (FW)	128 bit	KAT	CAST	Console message	Encrypt, decrypt	On boot
AES-GCM (CP9)	128 & 256-bit	KAT	CAST	Console message	Encrypt, decrypt	On boot
AES-GCM (NP7)	128 bit	KAT	CAST	Console message	Encrypt, decrypt	On boot
DH key pairs	-	PCT	PCT	Console message	Sign, verify	On key generation
DRBG (FW)	AES-256	KAT	CAST	Console message	Instantiate, generate, reseed	On boot
EC DH key pairs	-	PCT	PCT	Console message	Sign, verify, calculate public key	On key generation
ECDSA (FW)	P-256, P-384, P-521	KAT	CAST	Console message	Sign, verify	On boot
ECDSA key pairs	-	PCT	PCT	Console message	Sign verify, calculate public key	On key generation
Firmware load	RSA 2048-bit with SHA-1 or SHA2-256	SigVer	SW/FW Load	Console message	-	On FW load

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
HMAC-SHA-1 (CP9)	SHA-1	KAT	CAST	Console message	Generate	On boot
HMAC-SHA-1 (NP7)	SHA-1	KAT	CAST	Console message	Generate	On boot
HMAC-SHA-2 (NP7)	SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	Console message	Generate	On boot
IKEv1 KDF (FW)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Console message	Derive	On boot
IKEv2 KDF (FW)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Console message	Derive	On boot
KAS-ECC-SSC (FW)	P-256	KAT	CAST	Console message	Compute	On boot
KAS-FFC-SSC (FW)	MODP-2048	KAT	CAST	Console message	Compute	On boot
RSA (FW)	2048-bit	KAT	CAST	Console message	Sign, verify	On boot
RSA key pairs	-	PCT	PCT	Console message	Sign, verify, encrypt, decrypt	On key generation
SHA-1 (FW)	-	KAT	CAST	Console message	Hash	On boot
SHA-2 (FW)	SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	Console message	Hash	On boot
SHA-3 (FW)	SHA3-256	KAT	CAST	Console message	Hash	On boot
SSH KDF (FW)	SHA-1	KAT	CAST	Console message	Derive	On boot
TLS 1.2 KDF (FW)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Console message	Derive	On boot
TLS 1.3 KDF (FW)	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Console message	Derive	On boot
APT	Adaptive proportion test	FDT	CAST	Module Halt	On entropy source	On generation
RCT	Repetition count test	FDT	CAST	Module Halt	On entropy source	On generation

Table 26: Conditional Self-Tests

All cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs) are performed pre-operationally – before the module transitions to the operational state (in the approved mode).

Pairwise consistency test (PCTs) are performed automatically when an asymmetric key pair is generated.

10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information

The following self-tests can be invoked by the administrator as described in section 10.5 below. The module cannot invoke these tests automatically.

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
Configuration integrity	MAC	Critical Function	-	-
Firmware integrity	SigVer	SW/FW Integrity	On demand	Manually

Table 27: Pre-Operational Periodic Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
AES-CBC (CP9)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CBC (NP7)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-ECB (FW)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM (CP9)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM (NP7)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
DH key pairs	PCT	PCT	-	-
DRBG (FW)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
EC DH key pairs	PCT	PCT	-	-
ECDSA (FW)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA key pairs	PCT	PCT	-	-
Firmware load	SigVer	SW/FW Load	-	-
HMAC-SHA-1 (CP9)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA-1 (NP7)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA-2 (NP7)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
IKEv1 KDF (FW)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
IKEv2 KDF (FW)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KAS-ECC-SSC (FW)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KAS-FFC-SSC (FW)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA (FW)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA key pairs	PCT	PCT	-	-
SHA-1 (FW)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA-2 (FW)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA-3 (FW)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SSH KDF (FW)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
TLS 1.2 KDF (FW)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
TLS 1.3 KDF (FW)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
APT	FDT	CAST	-	-
RCT	FDT	CAST	-	-

Table 28: Conditional Periodic Information

10.4 Error States

Name	Description	Conditions	Recovery Method	Indicator
Error mode	All data output and cryptographic services are inhibited in the error state.	If any self-test fails	Power cycling	Self-tests failed Entering error mode... The system is going down NOW !! The system is halted

Table 29: Error States

If any of the self-tests or conditional tests fail, the module enters an error state as shown by the console output below:

```
Self-tests failed
Entering error mode...
The system is going down NOW !!
The system is halted.
```

All data output and cryptographic services are inhibited in the error state.

To resume operation, power cycle the FortiGate appliance. If the self-tests pass after the reboot, the module will resume normal operation in the approved mode. If a self-test continues to fail after rebooting, there is likely a serious problem and the FortiGate should not be used or have network access until the problem is solved

10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests

The administrator can run self-tests at any time. To run all of the tests, enter the following CLI command:

```
execute fips kat all
```

To run an individual test, enter:

```
execute fips kat <test_name>
```

To see the list of valid test names, enter:

```
execute fips kat ?
```

11 Life-Cycle Assurance

11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures

Fortinet hardware is shipped in a non-compliant state. The following steps must be performed to put the module into a FIPS-compliant configuration operating in the approved mode:

1. Download the model specific FIPS validated firmware image from the Fortinet Support site at <https://support.fortinet.com>
2. Verify the integrity of the firmware image
3. Install the FIPS validated firmware image
4. Enable the FIPS-CC mode of operation by issuing the following command from the Local Console:

```
config system fips-cc
set status enable
end
```

5. The Operator is required to supply a password for the admin account which will be assigned the Crypto Officer role. The supplied password must be at least 8 characters long and correctly verified, as which point the system will restart. Upon restart, the module will execute self-tests to ensure the correct initialization of the module's cryptographic functions.
6. After restarting, the Crypto Officer can confirm that the module is running in a compliant state by issuing the following command via the CLI:

```
get system status
```

The system status output will display the line:

```
FIPS-CC mode: enable
```

These steps are described in detail in the "FortiOS 7.2 and FortiGate NGFW Appliances – FIPS 140-3 and NDCPP Common Criteria Technote" document that can be found on the Fortinet Technical Documentation website.

The module is only considered to be operating in a compliant manner when the "FIPS-CC mode" has been configured as described above, and the administrator ensures that:

- The Crypto Officer shall set up the gateway or transparent mode as a deployment mode prior to configuring the FortiGate unit. Refer to section 2.4 for more details.
- The FortiGate unit is installed in a secure physical location.
- The tamper seals are applied as per the Physical Security instructions.
- Physical access to the FortiGate unit is restricted to authorized operators.
- Administrative passwords are changed regularly.
- Client side RSA certificates must use 2048 bit or greater key sizes.
- For IPSec VPN tunnels using AES-GCM, Fortinet recommends the default phase 1 key lifetime of 86,400 seconds.
- If the network requires a volume-based lifetime metric, 90,000 kB is recommended.

Once the FIPS validated firmware has been installed and the module properly configured, the module is running in a FIPS-compliant configuration.

11.2 Administrator Guidance

- [FortiGate/FortiOS 7.2 Administration Guide](#)

- [FortiGate/FortiOS 7.4 Administration Guide](#)

11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance

None.

11.4 Design and Rules

In approved mode, remote administration via HTTP or Telnet is disabled. HTTPS, SSH or the console should be used. The approved mode of operation restricts the cipher suites used by HTTPS and SSH to a subset of the FIPS 140-3 compliant suites. Thus, the administrator does not need to take any specific actions to ensure compliance.

To use the web-based manager in approved mode, your web browser application must meet the following requirements:

- Authentication algorithm: RSA or ECDSA
- Connection security: TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3

11.6 End of Life

Once the module has reached its end-of-life, the Crypto-Officer shall sanitize the module by invoking the 'Execute factory reset' service. This will zeroise all SSPs stored in volatile and non-volatile memory.

11.7 Additional Information

The module has been designed to enforce specific security requirements:

- Administrative passwords are at least 8 characters long.
- Administrator account passwords must have the following characteristics:
 - One (or more) characters must be capitalized
 - One (or more) characters must be lower case
 - One (or more) characters must be numeric
 - One (or more) characters must be non alpha-numeric (e.g. punctuation mark)
- Diffie-Hellman groups of less than 2048 bits are not used.

12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The module includes a real-time Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) as well as antivirus protection, web content filtering, DNS filtering, application control and data leak prevention. Use of these capabilities is optional.

12.1 Attack List

The FortiOS IPS has two components: a signature based component for detecting attacks passing through the FortiGate and a local attack detection component that protects the firewall from direct attacks. Functionally, signatures are similar to virus definitions, with each signature designed to detect a particular type of attack. The IPS signatures are updated through the FortiGuard IPS service. The IPS engine can also be updated through the FortiGuard IPS service. FortiOS antivirus protection removes and optionally quarantines files infected by viruses from web (HTTP), file transfer (FTP), and email (POP3, IMAP, and SMTP) content as it passes through the FortiGate modules. FortiOS antivirus protection also controls the blocking of oversized files and supports blocking by file extension. Virus signatures are updated through the FortiGuard antivirus service. The antivirus engine can also be updated through the FortiGuard antivirus service.

12.2 Mitigation Effectiveness

FortiOS antispam protection tags (SMTP, IMAP, POP3) or discards (SMTP only) email messages determined to be spam. Multiple spam detection methods are supported including the FortiGuard managed antispam service. FortiOS web filtering can be configured to provide web (HTTP) content filtering

FortiOS application control can detect and take action against network traffic depending on the application generating the traffic. FortiOS application control uses the FortiGuard application control database.

FortiOS web filtering uses methods such as banned words, address block/exempt lists, and the FortiGuard managed content service. FortiOS DNS filtering can be configured to provide web content (HTTP/HTTPS) content filtering based on DNS domain lookup. FortiOS DNS filtering uses the FortiGuard DNS database.

FortiOS data leak prevention is used to prevent sensitive data from leaving your network. After sensitive data patterns are defined, data matching the patterns will either be blocked or logged and then allowed.

Whenever a IPS, antivirus, or other filtering event occurs, the module can record the event in the log and/or send an alert email to an operator.

12.3 Guidance and Constraints

For complete information refer to the FortiOS Installation Guide. For the specific module in question, the FortiOS Administration Guide.



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